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Abstract
This paper argues that partisan gerrymanderers violate citizens’ right to privacy by using data
containing sensitive information on citizens without a compelling state interest. It first details
how partisan gerrymandering claims have been argued in Court in the past. Next, it discusses
theories of the right to privacy, mainly exploring the tensions between James Madison’s writings
on privacy and Warren and Brandeis’ famed The Right to Privacy. Then, I present originalist
arguments for upholding the original meaning and principles of the right to privacy and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments before walking through case law related to privacy and
technological advances. In conclusion, this paper holds that state legislatures violate the original
meaning of the right to privacy, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, when they
use anonymized data sets to partisan gerrymander. Resultingly, these data sets should only be
accessed when a compelling state interest is identified and partisan bias is curbed.
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Introduction: Partisan Gerrymandering and Privacy
Gerrymandering, the practice of manipulating state boundaries in order to favor one party
or class, has existed since early 1789 when George Washington and his Federalist allies accused
Patrick Henry of gerrymandering the Virginia map so that James Madison would lose to his
Anti-Federalist opponent, James Monroe.1 However, the practice gets its name from a map
manipulated by Elbridge Gerry, the Governor of Massachusetts between 1810 and 1812.2 Gerry
approved a map that advantaged the Republicans; one of the districts looked like a salamander as
a result of cartographic manipulation, and the name “gerry”-mander stuck.3 Since that time,
gerrymandering has leveraged data on citizens’ partisanship to create districts that benefit a
certain party. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that gerrymandering is “‘incompatible
with democratic principles,’” the Court has repeatedly ruled that partisan gerrymandering does
not violate the Constitution.4
Generally, the Court has upheld partisan gerrymanders because they see the issue as
nonjusticiable and therefore choose not to interfere in states’ jurisdiction over elections. While
the Supreme Court’s treatment of partisan gerrymandering has remained largely unchanged since
1979, the methods states use to partisan gerrymander have evolved and improved significantly.
In a recent partisan gerrymandering case, Rucho et al. v. Common Cause, Chief Justice Roberts
noted that “Partisan gerrymandering is nothing new. Nor is frustration with it.”5 He goes on to

1

Rucho et al. v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
Jessie Kratz, “The ‘Gerry’ in Gerrymandering,” National Archives Pieces of History (blog),
June 21, 2018, https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2018/06/21/the-gerry-in-gerrymandering/.
3
Ibid.
4
Rucho et al. v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
5
Ibid.
2
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cite the alleged gerrymander Henry carried out against James Madison as evidence that the
Framers were familiar with the practice and did not deem it unconstitutional. Upon reading Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion, I was struck by the fact that he did not mention technology a single
time– though technology has drastically changed partisan gerrymandering from what the
Founders once knew it to be.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan discusses technology extensively, noting that
while partisan gerrymandering dates back to the Founders, “big data and modern technology…
make today’s gerrymandering altogether different from the crude line drawing of the past.” 6
While I agree that technology has altered the act and impact of partisan gerrymandering, Justice
Kagan uses technology as evidence for the argument that it is so effective that it violates citizens’
rights in ways that it did not when the Founders encountered it. She argues “the right to
participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs, and to
choose their political representatives” are the rights violated.7 However, these would have been
the same rights violated by rudimentary gerrymandering, just not as effectively. As Chief Justice
Roberts notes, the Founders did not argue that these rights were violated when they were faced
with the issue. This presented a puzzle: the cases indicated that partisan gerrymandering was
getting more effective at subverting our democratic process, but the Founders did not dispute its
constitutionality.
How does technology make partisan gerrymandering more effective and durable? Using
map making software and data reflecting voting history and other third-party data beyond Census

6

Rucho et al. v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
Ibid.

7
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data, mapmakers have been able to generate thousands of map possibilities. Supplied with data
that describes voters, data scientists and political consultants can predict the electoral outcomes
of any given map and use that knowledge to gerrymander more effectively than before.8 The
Founders accepted biased maps made with crude Census data as nasty politics. But, James
Madison was able to overcome the alleged efforts of Patrick Henry and win the election. The
Founders never dreamt that data and map making software could allow data scientists to
correctly predict the winners of 97% of contested races, as Civis Analytics did in 2018.9 Madison
may not have met the same fate if Henry had these technologies at his disposal.
I argue that state governments’ use of non-census data to predict voters’ behavior is a
violation of the constitutional right to privacy. Supplementing census data with party registries,
past voting data, and third-party data is what enables mapmakers to “determine partisan
affiliation at a level of precision that did not exist in even the recent past.”10 It is novel to think
about privacy as a concern related to partisan gerrymandering, especially because the data they
use is anonymized. I attribute this novelty to a disconnect between the original meaning of
privacy that was understood by the Founders and written into the Bill of Rights and privacy as
we have come to know it today, as a right that we can easily sign away by mindlessly clicking “I
Agree” to the terms of service of a website.

“Brief of Amici Curiae Political Science Professors” (18-726, Washington, D.C., 2019).
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-422/91353/20190308145641704_2019-0308%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20Political%20Science%20Professors.pdf (Accessed October
1, 2021).
9
Ibid.
10
Rucho et al. v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
8
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In Chapter I of this thesis, I explain why constitutional challenges to partisan
gerrymandering have largely failed and outline the reasoning offered by the Court. In Chapter II,
I explore the theoretical right to privacy, and present the tension that exists between James
Madison’s account of privacy and modern-day notions of privacy, as articulated by Warren and
Brandeis. I argue that Madison’s account offers more robust privacy rights that protect one’s
right to exclude others from information about themselves, even if they do not legally own that
information and it is not linked to their identity. In Chapter III, I first outline methods of
originalist interpretation and argue that the original meaning of privacy in the Constitution was to
protect citizens from the government invading their privacy in order to oppress them. I then
present cases demonstrating that this right to privacy has been upheld by the Supreme Court and
has been interpreted to protect citizens from the government’s use of technologies that violate
this right; though, the original meaning of this right has yet to be fully translated to data as it is
used in redistricting. I conclude by addressing rebuttals to my argument, namely criticisms of the
feasibility of protecting this right to privacy in the context of redistricting, and by underscoring
the dangers our nation will face if we allow the use of data to derail the democratic process. As
Justice Kagan augured:
What was possible with paper and pen—or even with Windows 95—doesn’t hold a
candle (or an LED bulb?) to what will become possible with developments like machine
learning. And someplace along this road, “we the people” become sovereign no longer.11
Justice Kagan’s worry motivates this argument. By exploring how the right to privacy was
conceived prior to technology using Madison’s writing, examining the original meaning of
privacy as it was written into our Constitution, and how the Court has translated this right in their

11

Ibid.
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rulings, I aim to highlight a gap in our understanding of privacy when it comes to data. I argue
that by failing to translate the original meaning of the right to privacy to anonymized data, we
have failed to recognize that the use of citizen data to partisan gerrymander violates this right and
is therefore unconstitutional.
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Chapter I: How Partisan Gerrymandering Has Remained Constitutional
In this chapter I explore two questions: 1) What are the constitutional claims against partisan
gerrymandering thus far? and 2) Why have they failed? In Defining the Constitutional Question
in Partisan Gerrymandering, Richard Briffault summarizes the Supreme Courts history with
partisan gerrymandering claims:
[t]he Justices have bounced back and forth between the question of justiciability and the
standards of proving partisan gerrymandering without addressing, at any length, which
constitutional provision or norm gerrymandering might violate.12
Briffault presents the four constitutional arguments normally levied against partisan
gerrymandering, two of which are rooted in constitutional text and case law and two that have
circulated in academic writings. The constitutional arguments are that vote dilution, an effect of
partisan gerrymandering, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that partisan gerrymandering burdens political associations, which violates the First Amendment.
The academic arguments are that partisan gerrymandering interferes with competitive elections
which are essential to a functioning democracy and that excessive partisanship violates the
legislature’s obligation to legislate in the public interest. In this chapter, I focus on the
constitutional arguments as they are the claims that have been argued in front of the Supreme
Court.
Vote dilution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause has been the preeminent
argument used from Baker v. Carr to Rucho et. al v. Common Cause. However, in some cases,
like Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), Gill v. Whitford (2018), and Rucho et al. v. Common Cause
Richard Briffault, “Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering,” Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2005): 399,
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=faculty_scholar
ship.
12
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(2019), a First Amendment claim was cited as well, though these claims are often not taken up
by the Supreme Court. Briffault states that both these arguments are unlikely to succeed in the
eyes of the Court because they are at odds with the use of districting to elect legislators. Vote
dilution arguments assert that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when one party is denied
the share of seats in the legislature that it would have won based on its share of votes in
legislative elections.13
Baker v. Carr and Reynold v. Sims both dealt with vote dilution arguments, however in
these cases legislative apportionment, how many people were in each district, was the issue – not
proportional representation. In both cases, the Court found the issue justiciable, and in Reynolds
the Court adopted “one-person, one-vote” as a principle stemming from the Equal Protection
Clause. This decision set the precedent that states must draw district lines so districts contain as
nearly equal populations as possible. Vote dilution claims arising from a lack of proportional
representation are much trickier; while Baker and Reynolds involved claims that the weight of a
vote in a more populated district was diluted relative to less populous districts, proportional
representation claims hinge on proving that the partisan composition of the districts dilutes the
votes cast for a certain party when translating votes to legislative seats. However, as the cases
after Baker and Reynolds show, it is much easier to prove bias in the population sizes of different
districts than to prove bias in the partisan makeup of different districts, since partisanship is more
fluid and harder to quantify.
In 1986, Davis v. Bandemer presented the first vote dilution case involving proportional
representation, but the Court ruled that the effects of the partisan gerrymander were not

13

Ibid.

Deckey 11

“sufficiently adverse.”14 The appellants argued that “each political group in a State should have
the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group.”15 The Court
rejected this claim for multiple reasons: the one-person, one-vote rule is not violated since the
districts populations only differed by about 1%; the outcome of a singular election fails to serve
as evidence of a consistent degradation of one’s vote; and, further, the Constitution and its oneperson, one-vote principle does not require proportional representation.
Briffault offers a clear explanation of why the Court holds that “one-person, vote-vote”
requires legislative apportionment but not proportional representation. Briffault states that
proportional representation claims assume that voters fall cleanly into a discrete partisan group.
However, voters switch parties without changing their registration, split tickets, or refrain from
registering all together.16 Thus, the actual votes cast in a district in a legislative election may be
“an artifact of the districting plan itself– in a one-party district, for example, members of the out
party may not even bother to vote-or of anomalies such as an unusually charismatic or a scandalridden candidate.”17 Thus, critics of gerrymandering prefer to use other metrics of party strength
beyond aggregate votes, like “statewide vote for a down-ticket state office,” but these measures
can be highly debatable.18 Even if this wasn’t the case and every voter was registered to a party
and voted down the party line, this sort of vote dilution argument is vulnerable to the claim that
proportional representation is not required by the Constitution. Justice Scalia was quick to point

14

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Ibid.
16
Richard Briffault, “Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering,” Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2005): 405,
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=faculty_scholar
ship.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
15
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out in Vieth v. Jubelirer, “the Constitution contains no such principle.”19 Lastly, Briffault points
out that the single-member district system required for congressional elections and adopted by
many state legislatures often impedes proportionality. He gives the example: “In the extreme
case, with the two major parties evenly distributed throughout a state, if a party were to win 51%
of the vote in every district, it would win 51% of the statewide popular vote but 100% of the
statewide legislative seats.”20 Thus, it is hard to argue that proportionality is a norm. Due to these
theoretical tensions with districting, Fourteenth Amendment claims have failed to be upheld by
the Supreme Court, with the exception of the legislative apportionment cases, Baker v. Carr and
Reynolds v. Sims.
First Amendment challenges to partisan gerrymandering have had a similar fate. Though
several of the cases I discuss involved First Amendment claims filed with lower courts, those
claims were either not taken up by the lower courts or dismissed in the beginning of the
majority's opinions. Vieth v. Jubelirer is a perfect example; the district court rejected all claims,
including their freedom of association First Amendment claim, except their “one-person, onevote” claim. The Court held that voters were not “denied representation, only that they would be
represented by Republican officials.”21 They were able to vote (without legislative
apportionment dilution), to be placed on the ballot box, to associate with a party, and express
their political opinion, and thus the political discrimination claim failed. Briffault points out that
Justice Kennedy, in his Vieth opinion, said that the First Amendment “may be the more relevant

19

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2003).
Richard Briffault, “Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering,” Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2005): 406,
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=faculty_scholar
ship.
21
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
20
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constitutional provision in future cases” since the allegations involve the amendment’s “interest
of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process,
their voting history, their association with a political party, or their expression of political
views.”22 This argument would build on the Court’s patronage cases “which deny the state the
power to condition a government contract or governmental hiring or promotion on partisan
activity.”23 However, these claims have failed to be successful. Justice Scalia stated that if the
First Amendment were to be applied in districting as it is in patronage cases it “would render
unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in hiring for nonpolicy-level government
jobs.”24 The Court repeatedly acknowledges that, as Justice White explained in Davis v.
Bandemer, “Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and
apportionment.”25 Thus, some partisan considerations are allowed in the eyes of the Court. If the
First Amendment does not succeed in making these considerations unconstitutional altogether,
then it is unclear where the line is drawn–as noted by Briffault.26
Briffault neatly characterized the two leading constitutional objections to partisan
gerrymandering. However, I also want to detail some of the more technical considerations in the
Court cases and outline how the Court’s interpretation of partisan gerrymanders has evolved. I

Richard Briffault, “Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering,” Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2005): 407,
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=faculty_scholar
ship.
23
Ibid, 408.
24
Ibid, 408.
25
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1985).
26
Richard Briffault, “Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering,” Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2005): 409,
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=faculty_scholar
ship.
22
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will present this timeline and the technical considerations concurrently, before using Jacob
Eisler’s The Constitutionalization of Statistics to explain some of the most recent Court debacles
over determining how much partisan gerrymandering is too much.
The first two partisan gerrymandering cases I take up, Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v.
Sims were already discussed above. Importantly, they dealt with legislative apportionment, not
proportional representation claims. Baker v. Carr presented the question of whether partisan
gerrymandering cases, under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, can be tried
by federal courts; the answer to this question according to the Warren Court was yes. 27 In
Reynolds, the Court argued that “one person, one vote,” a penumbra first delineated in Gray v.
Sanders, supported their decision in Reynolds. In Gray, the Court held that, “The conception of
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person, one
vote.”28
I want to pause quickly to underscore Chief Justice Warren’s reasoning behind his
Reynolds decision. First, he notes that a state can only be found in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause if the rights that are violated are “individual and personal in nature” and he
references United States v. Bathgate which established that the right to vote is indeed personal.29
Next, he states that “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”30 Therefore, Alabama’s General Assembly

Baker et al. v. Carr et al., 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
27

28
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cannot argue, as they did, that the geographic area of counties can justify giving one larger
geographic area “two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of citizens in another
part of the State.’31 Chief Justice Warren states that the discrimination of the disfavored
individual votes is easily demonstrable mathematically. He then underscores that state
governments, which hold “a most important place in our Nation's governmental structure,” have
a right to some autonomy, but still have to allow their citizens to fully and effectively participate
in the state government.32 He continues:
We are admonished not to restrict the power of the States to impose differing views as to
political philosophy on their citizens. We are cautioned about the dangers of entering into
political thickets and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial of
constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office
require no less of us.33
Thus, Chief Justice Warren outlined three things: that a constitutionally violated right must be
individual in nature, districts must have similar populations, and if these rights are violated– it is
required that the judiciary protects voters.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the first proportional representation case that I take up, it becomes
clear that the Court found many faults in vote dilution claims extending beyond legislative
apportionment. The Court has held that redistricting plans that were equal in population but
gerrymandered on the basis of race were unconstitutional, as it did in Shaw v. Reno.34 Racial
gerrymandering is distinct because political preferences change while one’s race does not, nor
has party preference “been subject to the same historical stigma.”35 Vote dilution claims that are

31

Ibid.
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34Shaw. v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
35
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1985).
31
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based on proportional representation are harder to prove in relation to political groups for two
reasons. First, evidence of intentional discrimination via “historical patterns of exclusion from
the political processes” are generally more likely to be present for a racial group than a political
party. Secondly, intentionally drawn majorities or minorities of a specific race are durable over
time whereas the partisan bias in a map’s composition may be undone over time as peoples’
political views shift.36 If a map dilutes the votes of individuals of a certain race, it would clearly
violate the Fourteenth Amendment and proving discriminatory intent would be simpler.
However, the Court employs a higher standard of proof for claims of partisan discrimination
because partisanship is inherent to redistricting. As such, the discrimination, which Justice White
points out is inherent, must be “sufficiently adverse.”37 Further, unconstitutional discrimination
occurs only when the electoral system “is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a
voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole.”38 Davis dealt with a
group of Democrats claiming that the state apportionment scheme diluted their votes, using the
results of a single election as evidence.39 The majority found this evidence insufficient to prove
that the Democrats couldn’t win more seats in the elections to come.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the majority decided not to intervene– though Justice Kennedy, the
fifth Justice of the majority, split with them on whether partisan gerrymandering was justiciable.
Writing for the four-member plurality, Justice Scalia concluded that political gerrymandering

Richard Briffault, “Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering,” Cornell
Journal of Law and Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2005): 403,
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1915&context=faculty_scholar
ship.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1985).
36
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claims are “nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating such claims exist.”40 He argued that partisan gerrymandering dated back to colonial
times and continued through the founding. The Framers chose to deal with partisan
gerrymandering by giving state legislatures the power to draw federal election districts and
allowing Congress to “make or alter” those districts.41 However, Scalia argued that neither
Article 1, Section 2, 4, nor the Equal Protection Clause offered a judicially enforceable limit on
what political considerations the states may account for when districting. Without a judicially
discernable standard, the issue appears to be a “political question” which makes it nonjusticiable,
contrary to the findings of Davis. Scalia stated, “Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually
nothing to show for it justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard promised by
Davis exists.”42 The plurality “would therefore overrule [Davis], and decline to adjudicate these
political gerrymandering claims.”43
Justice Kennedy argued that in order to find partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional,
the determination must rest on something more objective than proving that political
considerations were used in redistricting. The decision would require proof that partisan
considerations, “though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way
unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.”44 Justice Kennedy argued that determining that
all partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, as the plurality wished to do, could erode
confidence in the courts as much as a premature decision to intervene would.45 Because there

40

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2003).
Ibid
42
Ibid
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
41
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was only a majority for the decision to not intervene, but not for the nonjusticiable finding,
partisan gerrymandering claims remained justiciable under the Davis v. Bandemer precedent.
After Vieth was decided in 2004, Gill v. Whitford and Rucho et. al v. Common Cause
were decided in 2017 and 2019 respectively. Following the Vieth ruling, the state of mapmaking
changed significantly. In both Gill and Rucho, the technology used to gerrymander had evolved
significantly, and statistical evidence was submitted to the Court in attempts to prove that the
partisan gerrymanders were extremely adverse. In Gill v. Whitford, 12 Democrats from
Wisconsin argued that Act 43, a redistricting plan passed after the 2010 census, harmed the
Democratic Party’s ability to convert votes to seats.46 The plaintiffs argued that this phenomenon
could be measured by an “efficiency gap” that “compares each party’s respective “wasted”
votes—i.e., votes cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of what that
candidate needs to win—across all legislative districts.”47 The Democrats argued that the excess
of wasted Democratic votes created by Act 43 violated their First Amendment right of
association and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The defendants, several
members of the state election commission, argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing
because “their legally protected interests extend only to the makeup of the legislative district in
which they vote.” The Court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate Article III standing. The
plaintiffs argued that the efficiency gap caused a statewide injury to Wisconsin Democrats,
instead of focusing on an earlier claim that four of them had made that this caused an individual
harm to them.

46

Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, 585 U.S. (2018).
Ibid.

47
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In Rucho, while the plaintiffs had standing, the Court affirmed, in a 5-4 split, that partisan
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable. While the Court can answer various questions related
to districting–like racial gerrymandering– it is beyond its power to answer when partisan
considerations have gone too far in the absence of a “constitutional directive or legal standards to
guide us in the exercise of such authority.”48 Further, in response to the statistical tests presented
by the appellants, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated that none of these tests
“[meet] the need for a limited and precise standard that is judicially discernible and
manageable.”49 Chief Justice Roberts notes multiple reasons why these statistical tests fail. First,
he argued that the statistical tests all rely on “different visions of fairness,” which raises
questions that are political, not legal.50 Second, Chief Justice Roberts writes that using these tests
to “prove” that gerrymanders are durable is unreliable since “experience proves that accurately
predicting electoral outcomes is not so simple.” 51 He points out that in both Davis and Vieth the
parties that were allegedly harmed by unconstitutional gerrymanders went on to win seats.52
Finally, he stated that these tests fail to provide “a solid grounding for judges to take the
extraordinary step of reallocating power and influence between political parties.”53 The Court, as
Briffault explained, found that the claim was not rooted in a constitutional principle that would
make the case clearly justiciable. Ultimately, in both Gill and Rucho, the statistical evidence used
to make arguments that vote dilution distorted proportional representation and violated citizens’
Fourteenth Amendment rights failed in the eyes of the Court.

48

Rucho et al. v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
49
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Transitioning to the conclusion of this chapter, I want to present Jacob Eisler’s The
Constitutionalization of Statistics to explain in broad strokes why the statistical tests failed in
Gill and Whitford, and detail the technological advances in redistricting that contextualize my
argument in Chapter II. Eisler argues that while statistical analysis can be useful evidence in
partisan gerrymandering cases, it poses a grave danger if we attempt to use statistical metrics to
define rights violations. He writes, “Without a clear relationship to a legal principle, the
efficiency gap, partisan symmetry, or any other metric is constitutionally empty. If courts define
illegal partisan gerrymandering by metrics, it would produce fragile precedent and betray the rule
of law.”54 He explains that “rights are best understood as creating zones of protection that
provide non-conditional weight to certain characteristics or activities.”55 While non-conditional
rights may be weighed against with other rights and state interests, Eisler argues that a
constitutional right cannot be rooted in a quantitative threshold. When rights violations are
defined by quantitative outcomes, as they were in Gill with efficiency gaps or in Rucho with
partisan symmetry, the Court is expected to become policy regulators, making rulings when
maps violate a certain metric rather than by identifying an unconstitutional act. However, Eisler
does not argue that statistical modeling has no place in partisan gerrymandering as “disregarding
the information provided by the new quantitative methods would deprive courts of powerful
evidentiary tools.”56 For example, quantitative data may be relevant to arguments regarding the
balancing of rights. However, Eisler argues that partisan gerrymandering law “needs a new
principle, not new metrics.”57 While I agree with him here, he proposes that this new principle is
Jacob Eisler, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Constitutionalization of Statistics,” Emory Law
Journal 68, no. 6 (2019): pp. 981-1035, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3145191.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
54
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“the right to fair representation [is] violated when legislatures seize partisan advantage in
democratic processes.”58 However, I believe this principle runs into the same problem as Gill and
Rucho, where they argued vote dilution violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Since statistics can
only evidence how much partisan advantage was seized, but not whether it crossed a
constitutional standard, I argue the case against partisan gerrymandering needs a new principle
that can overcome the shortcomings of vote dilution arguments that the Court spelled out in the
cases detailed in this chapter.
Regardless of where Eisler and I disagree, his ideas still prove useful to my argument. He
states that:
The fevered condition of partisan gerrymandering litigation can be attributed to the
intersection of three factors: the application of sophisticated data analysis to ruthlessly
gerrymander legislative districts; the use of similar tools by leading anti-gerrymandering
reformers and courts to identify and classify such politicized districting; and the confused
state of the partisan gerrymandering precedent thanks to Davis v. Bandemer and Vieth v.
Jubelirer.59
Where Eisler sees a statistical fire storm, I see a privacy rights violation that cropped up between
the Davis ruling in 1986 and the Vieth verdict in 2004. While the gerrymanders of Baker,
Reynolds, and Davis used cartographers and census information to create districts that would
benefit their party, by the 1990 redistricting cycle, the process had begun to go digital. 60
However, the redistricting software ran on enormous computers, was extremely expensive, and
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was prone to error. Around this time, the Caliper Corporation, a mapping software company,
created a mapping software that, intended for transportation officials, turned out to be compatible
with the cumbersome data type that census information came in (raw TIGER files).61 The
program was sold to state officials as GIS Plus, a redistricting software that, for the first time,
could run on desktops. By the 2000 districting cycle, Caliper was fully committed to redistricting
and sold a new, more advanced redistricting product called Maptitutde, which “allowed even
people who had very little training in mapping or programming to get their hands dirty and
import voting data with ease.”62 The Republicans adopted Maptitude in their redistricting efforts
nationwide in 2000, and employed it as a tool in their REDMAP campaign, a campaign meant to
target state legislative races in 2010 so that they could control the states’ upcoming redistricting
cycle.63 While this redistricting revolution started with a new type of software, eventually the
software became capable of running on more than census data– and the more information it had
on voters, the better it predicted their votes.
Van R. Newkirk II wrote in The Atlantic,
According to Michael Li, senior counsel at the Brennan Center for Justice, “certainly,
technology has gotten a lot more sophisticated, and it’s enabled map drawers to draw
much more durable gerrymanders than they have in the past. That’s because state
mapmakers now know a lot more about voters. That’s just an extension of the big data
revolution that you also see in marketing and other politics.64
The big data revolution, I argue, is where gerrymandering crossed the line from a political evil to
a clear constitutional violation. Today, partisan gerrymandering thrives on its ability to violate
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voters’ privacy and predict their voting behaviors with increasing accuracy. The article goes on
to say that the field of big data has grown to include “the use of consumer data and other huge
political datasets in order to achieve one of the holy grails of redistricting: microtargeting below
precinct lines.”65 This data is anonymized so to avoid privacy concerns, but is still used to
manipulate the districts where the subjects of the anonymized data reside. As I will develop in
the next chapter, this is a violation of citizens’ privacy and it presents a distinct unconstitutional
act that was not present in the pesky gerrymanders of before. In Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts
said that “experience proves that accurately predicting electoral outcomes is not so simple,”
however, this violation makes accurate predictions much simpler. My account does not tackle
data privacy generally, rather it focuses on a zone of privacy that any citizen constitutionally
holds against its government.
Ultimately, technology, namely data sets and statistical modeling, complicated the
argument surrounding the standards of partisan gerrymandering because, while it provided new
evidence, it was used to make the same vote dilution arguments the Court had previously
rejected. However, it is possible to disarm partisan gerrymandering and impede its newfound
effectiveness, by identifying the constitutional right to privacy, as effective gerrymanders rely on
the violation of this right. A violation of one’s privacy in order to dilute their vote meets the
standards of justiciability that all the cases I’ve outlined have failed to: it is an individual harm, it
provides a clear violation without requiring an unmanageable standard, it is not reliant on
election results, and lastly– regardless of the partisanship that is allowed in the state map making
process– it is unconstitutional to violate citizens’ privacy without a compelling state interest. In
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Chapter II, I detail this right to privacy, whose original meaning should protect even anonymized
data, and the tensions that underlie modern day conceptions of privacy. In Chapter III, I aim to
prove that this right is protected by the Constitution and has been applied in precedent to protect
citizens’ zone of privacy and halt government use of technologies that threaten this zone.

Deckey 25

Chapter II: An Account of Data Privacy Rights
I argue that state legislatures violate a citizen’s right to privacy when they use citizen’s
data to gerrymander electoral maps. This argument hinges on proving 1) that citizens retain a
right to privacy over their data even when it is anonymized and 2) that these rights are protected
by the Constitution. In this chapter, I will articulate my account of our right to privacy in regards
to data. While data is a modern invention and our data privacy rights are still developing, I
believe this right has evolved from thoroughly developed discussions on intellectual property and
privacy. However, there is an interesting split in the discussion on privacy rights that has
muddled the concept at times. This debate arises again in the Supreme Court opinions I present
in the next chapter, when Justice Scalia and Justice Alito debate where the right to privacy stems
from. In this chapter, I present this conceptual split in privacy scholarship and examine the
differences. Understanding both conceptions of privacy helps offer us a clearer understanding of
how we should conceptualize our right to data privacy in the realm of partisan gerrymandering,
where anonymous data is being used to manipulate the districts where the subjects of the data
reside.
James Madison’s and Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis’ accounts of privacy
illustrate the divide in privacy writings. Generally, Warren and Brandeis’ account has reigned
supreme in modern debates, and thus I discuss Cameron F. Kerry and John B. Morris’ Why Data
Ownership is The Wrong Approach to Protecting Privacy, which applies the modern conception
of privacy to data specifically. Kerry and Morris animate the differences between Madison’s and
Warren and Brandeis’ accounts. Finally, I discuss Chris Evans’ It’s the Autonomy, Stupid:
Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the Information Age to begin and conclude this
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chapter as it helps contextualize data privacy within the political landscape and highlight why the
government’s use of aggregated data is a privacy violation.
In James Madison’s essay On Property, written in 1792, he writes that the term
“property,” in its more commonly used narrower sense, is “‘that dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual.’”66
However, in its “larger and juster meaning” it encapsulates everything that one can attach a value
to and have a right to, leaving everyone else a similar advantage.67 In this sense, his conception
of property is very Lockean; when an individual, who owns themselves and their liberty, mixes
their labor with something and gives it value, the product is then their property.68 Under its
narrower meaning, Madison writes that an individual’s land, merchandise, or money is
considered property. However, in its broader and more just interpretation, one “has a property in
his opinions and the free communication of them.”69 This broad Madisonian property extends to
the property one holds in their religious beliefs, in the safety and liberty of one’s person, and in
the “free use of his facilities and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.”70 Madison
continues “as a [person] is said to have a right to [their] property, [they] may be equally said to
have a property in [their] rights.”71 The sort of property right Madison is articulating differs from
the traditional view of property. Property is often associated with external things an individual
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has control over and can choose to sell. However, in Madison’s account, first comes our
property, the property we hold in ourselves, our liberty, and objects we mix with, and from
property and liberties comes our right to privacy. Violating our privacy is violating the property
right we hold in ourselves and infringing on the property right we hold in our liberties.
After offering this account of property, Madison writes about the government's role in
this system of property:
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the
various rights of individuals... that alone is a just government, which impartially secures
to every man, whatever is his own.72
Understanding the right to privacy in property that Madison articulates, the government’s role is
much simplified and the reach of the Bill of Rights is greatly broadened. Namely, the
government is meant to protect individuals, their rights to themselves and their dominion, and the
property that extends from the person and their rights. While this may seem very similar to what
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights already does–there is an important difference that is
perfectly illustrated by the case of privacy rights. Today, property rights and privacy rights are
two distinct sets of rights. People think of privacy as something that has to do with one’s specific
identity, keeping their identity private from the public view. Property rights are generally
associated with land, objects, and intellectual property and one’s right to exclude others from
access to their property. These rights have been separated and thus when data on an anonymous
person is used, it is not an issue of their privacy because their identity is not revealed. However,
Madison’s account inherently connects these two concepts. If data on an anonymous person is
used, but their identity is not attached to the object, it is a violation of their property right over
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themselves and the privacy right that stems from it. Since their person and actions are their
property, it violates their right to exclude others from the property they hold in themselves–a
violation of property is inherently a privacy violation regardless of if their identity was revealed.
On Madison’s account, any violation of property violates one’s privacy, privacy is not linked to
identity per se but it is linked to one’s liberty to exist and exercise their free choice over their
property. It is a pervasive theory of privacy that does not track with modern ideas of keeping
one’s identity private but instead is constituted of the property we hold in ourselves that allows
us to keep our existence, actions, and objects private.
In The Right To Privacy, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis argue that the right to
privacy is a right that exists separately from intellectual property rights. They write that a wide
range of intangible rights arose from physical property over the years.73 This reference seems to
overlap with Madison’s account, but as they go on their conception of privacy becomes distinct
from property rights. Warren and Brandeis point out that right to privacy is secured by Common
Law, which “each individual has the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others” – as is demonstrated by the
fact that an individual cannot be compelled to express these thoughts (except on the witness
stand).74 They write that “the existence of this right [to privacy] does not depend upon the
particular method of expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be by word or by signs, in
painting, by sculpture, or in music.”75 Warren and Brandeis state that “the right is lost only when
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the author himself communicates his production to the public, – in other words, publishes it.”76
They argue that the right to privacy is an inherent right distinct from slander, contract, or other
intellectual property laws, since when one’s privacy is violated they are subject to an emotional
harm that “demands legal recognition.”77 In this sense, while privacy rights arose from property,
they argue that the right to privacy is distinct from the right one holds over their property.
Warren and Brandeis present arguments revolving around contract law in English Courts
to demonstrate the distinction between privacy rights and rights arising from contracts or
property. In the cases they present, photographs or portraits of individuals were used by the
person who took or printed the photos without the subject's consent. In the English cases, the
Court repeatedly protected the plaintiff’s right to property over images of their likeness because
the defendants use or distribution of those images violated an expectation or contract that was
established when the plaintiff used the defendant to retain the individual for the photo service.78
Warren and Brandeis argue that implying that a contract is what protects one’s privacy is
“nothing more nor less than a judicial declaration that public morality, private justice, and
general convenience demand the recognition of such a rule.”79 While this “narrower doctrine”
may have worked when photographs and portraits could only be created in a situation that
required consent, Warren and Brandeis explain that modern technology allows privacy violations
to take place without “any participation by the injured party.”80 Therefore, they conclude that the
right to privacy is truly rooted, not in contract law nor property law, but in a right we hold

76

Ibid.
Ibid, 195.
78
Ibid, 208.
79
Ibid, 210.
80
Ibid.
77

Deckey 30

“against the world.”81 They note that this right must yield to “public welfare or… private justice”
when courts, legislative bodies, or municipal assemblies need the information to pursue general
interests.82
These two conceptions of privacy, Madison’s extending from the property we hold in
ourselves and Warren and Brandeis’ existing as a standalone right, create a tension in how
privacy ought to be protected. If Madison were to engage with Warren and Brandeis’
photography example, he would likely argue that duplicitous attempts to take photographs of an
individual would infringe on their liberty to not be photographed if they please or on their right
to exclude others from the property one holds in themselves. The need for an independent
privacy right, separate from the property right one holds in themselves, would be redundant.
However, Warren and Brandeis see the need for this right to exist independently of property and
contract laws that do not consider the emotional harm that results from privacy violations.
Madison’s account pairs these two harms together, since a property violation under his reading
would violate both the person whose liberty is mixed in with the property (an emotional, private
harm) and the property itself, which may have economic value to the person as well. This
disconnect can be boiled down to viewing property as inanimate, economically valuable things,
as Warren and Brandeis do, versus viewing property as an all-encompassing part of one’s
personhood, as Madison does. I argue that Madison’s account offers a fuller understanding of
why violating one’s privacy, or using their data, is a serious rights violation against the property
one holds in themselves, even when this data is anonymized as it often is in the redistricting
process. However, much of the literature on privacy rights follows the school of thought birthed
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by Warren and Brandeis’ account. As such, property rights largely determine if one has a right to
exclude others, while privacy rights have been used to protect individuals’ identities. Privacy
rights, and the tensions between these two conceptions, are further obfuscated when applied to
the fledgling concept of data and data privacy.
I will now present these competing conceptions in the context of the data privacy issues
that this argument is focused on. Technology has evolved so that the internet, computers, and
cameras can collect individuals’ information in ways unforeseen by privacy scholars. 83 Chris
Evans writes that “cameras, cell-phones, consumer transactions, Global Positioning System
(GPS) devices in cars, toll booths, email, monitoring software, cookies, and other technologies”
are compiled so that simple transactions– that may appear harmless to consumers – can be
amassed into digital dossiers.84 These dossiers reveal facts about individuals that extend “far
beyond anything they expected when they gave out the data.”85 These pieces of data, while
seemingly benign, are aggregated in order to identify population trends and describe individual
habits or behaviors. Even when this data does not reveal the individual’s identity, the information
can help data scientists create things that will affect the population that the individual resides
in—like gerrymandered maps or, more frequently, advertisements. Evans explains that
aggregation has yet to be identified as a privacy concern because it has only come about in recent
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decades.86 Aggregation violates one’s privacy “by revealing aspects of a person’s private life
[they] might prefer to be kept private.”87
In Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy, Chris Evans helps connect Warren and
Brandeis’ account to the modern data landscape. Evans notes that data differs from public
statements, or portraits taken by a photographer, in an important way. While Warren and
Brandeis argue that publicly shared information is exempt from privacy concerns because the
individual deliberately gave up their right to privacy, aggregation presents a violation of one’s
right to choose to interact and consent to a situation where information, or a photo of them, is
being collected. This aligns with Warren and Brandeis’ criticism of contracts or trust as an
inadequate reason for protecting privacy since technology allows portraits to be taken
surreptitiously. While one may agree to the terms and conditions of the initial moment of data
collection (the justness of which is another matter), they don’t consent to the evolving
technology of aggregation which takes that initial situation out of context, unbeknownst to them
and creates a digital file on the individual.
Others argue that this realm of personal information should be considered the property of
the individual. The idea that an object is created because a unique individual interacts with it and
gives it value is the basis of James Madison’s understanding of property and is at the core of
intellectual property laws that Warren and Brandeis mention in building their account. However,
in Why Data Ownership is the Wrong Approach to Protecting Privacy, Kerry and Morris write
that viewing data as property is a misrepresentation of its public and private value as a source of
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information. Kerry and Morris argue that “personal information is in demand precisely because it
has value to others and to society across a myriad of uses.”88 Kerry and Morris’ conception of
data privacy follows the line of thinking that Warren and Brandeis articulate: that privacy rights
and property rights are two distinct rights. Following Madison’s account this conception seems
to minimize the essential role of the individual who is the source of the data’s information. The
problem arises that property is now generally thought of as an inherently transactional class of
objects that don’t align with the all-encompassing person-based property that Madison writes of.
Kerry and Morris argue that the property-privacy conception is ill-fitting because: 1) data
is often the product of an interaction involving more than one person 2) that data becomes
valuable once it is aggregated at the individual and public level, and 3) that data has an intrinsic
personal value that would be diminished if it is treated as a commodity. These nuances better fit
the conceptions of privacy and property that most people hold today. However, these three points
would not be in tension with property as Madison defines it– as something that is not a
commodity but is an extension of one’s personhood that, like one’s body, does not have to be on
the market solely because it is considered property. I will examine Kerry and Morris’ points,
demonstrating how their conception of property differs from Madison’s. However, upon
finishing this examination, the issue arises that if these definitions of property and privacy are so
ingrained in society’s lexicon, it may be more productive for this argument to work with these
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common definitions while using Madison’s account as background for understanding the deeper
right underlying privacy and property as society understands them.
Kerry and Morris hold that data is often the product of an interaction. Viewing data as
property one individual holds is complicated by the fact that merchants, social media companies,
or other organizations are also stakeholders in the interaction. Kerry and Morris write that “the
digital economy operates in broad ecosystems of data-sharing for diverse uses.”89 When you
purchase something, the record of your purchase is kept by the merchant. This is a form of data.
Kerry and Morris offer examples of these sorts of mutual rights to one’s information: credit
reporting, bank clearing, know-your-customer rules, and fraud monitoring.90 These interactions
are regulated by laws, like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the EU’s General Data Protection Act,
and California’s Consumer Privacy Act.91 The law often requires that records of these
transactions be kept by third parties involved in these transactions. Thus, if data from these sorts
of transactions was considered property, it would be owned by two parties according to Kerry
and Morris. However, the mutual nature of data does not justify the fact that data is sold off to
entities that were not part of the initial transaction. This is a violation of our right to privacy,
regardless of whether it should be considered property. This point is the least in tension with
Madison’s account, though his understanding would likely hold that the property rights we hold
in the information created from these interactions grants us a right to forbid the third parties from
sharing this data without our consent.
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Next, Kerry and Morris argue that data is valuable because it can identify a person who
exists within the context of a broader population. Kerry and Morris use the example of a name to
illustrate this value. One’s name is fundamental to their identity and is one of the first items
protected by established privacy laws, like the Protection of Identity of Child Witnesses and
Victims, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), or Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). While individuals hold a value in their name and
the identity and properties linked to that name this value is not exclusive.92 Names are “essential
social and economic currency that is valuable to others” as they are the way that we are
recognized by our friends and family, by society for voting registration, property deeds, financial
accounts, and the list goes on.93 As such, Kerry and Morris argue that while we retain some
privacy rights over our name and our persons, they are also essential to the functioning of
society. Names are valuable because they can identify an individual among a population of other
named individuals. Social security numbers perform the same function, but are protected by a
greater expectation of privacy as they are more unique and secure. Data likely lies somewhere in
between these two forms of identification, but Kerry and Morris’ point is that it is information
not an intellectual property that is valuable solely because of a single person's inputs. The
complexities of data as a shared entity and the privacy rules that apply to it have been considered
in Court, as in Carpenter v. United States which I detail in the next chapter, and some privacy
protections have been codified in law as mentioned above (HIPAA, FERPA, etc.). These areas of
precedent on the protection of information indicate that the government is still bound by
constitutional edicts to respect individual privacy rights, regardless of data’s status as
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information or property. Madison’s account is in tension with Kerry and Morris’ conception.
First, the value in data, whether from aggregation or the piece of data itself, would stem from the
property individuals hold in themselves and the choice they made to create the data. Just because
it is a piece of information that has some need to be shared, would not immediately conflict with
its status as a piece of a person’s property, in the broad sense. As property under Madison’s
definition, data should still be granted the privacy considerations that Kerry and Morris speak of
but its value as a shared information, even when the individual’s identity is protected, does not
erase the broad property right that an individual has in data that is describing them, and the right
to exclude that stems from that right. Kerry and Morris believe that viewing data as information
respects an inherent right to keep data private– a right that becomes saleable once data is
classified as property. Madison’s account rejects this dichotomy.
Finally, Kerry and Morris argue that data should not be a commodity.94 While data sets
are currently sold to third parties, Kerry and Morris argue that stronger privacy rights, property
rights, would better protect citizens from these transactions. Monetizing a single person's data,
Kerry and Morris argue, may “induce people to trade away their privacy rights for very little
value” while impeding other uses that could be beneficial to public causes and be better
protected by unsaleable privacy rights. Under a property-based understanding of data, Kerry and
Morris explain that individuals are allowed to sign away their rights in exchange for the service a
website or app can offer. If this property right is eventually monetized, it is estimated that a
person could be paid around $0.0005 for a piece of information, and this could increase slightly
depending on how much data they sell or how profitable the information could be (like
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information on a person who is in the market for a car).95 Kerry and Morris articulate the worry
that a right to data privacy rooted in a property right will allow one to sell their data which runs
the risk of many harms to one’s privacy, without adequate reward. This, I argue, is the key
tension with Madison. Madison does not assume that all property is on the market. Under
Madison’s account it would not follow that, solely because data is considered property one holds
as an extension of themselves, it is something that the individual must have a right to sell. He
writes that, in its broader meaning, one has a “property very dear to him in the safety and liberty
of his person,” but if it is illegal to sell one’s body on the market, it does not diminish the
individual’s property right to have liberty over his body, even if the law forbids them from
selling their body. It is not clear that classifying data as a property requires that it be saleable on
a market. Our bodies are our property, but it would be inappropriate, and illegal, to sell your
body or body parts. These sorts of properties are so intrinsic to your personhood that they cannot
be for sale. While Kerry and Morris make a compelling argument that data should not be
protected at the will of consumer choice, it is not clear that this forbids it from being considered
property. Further, stronger privacy rights may only protect individuals’ identity from being sold,
while the information on them that is useful for predicting and profiting off of their behaviors is
still available to third parties purchasing these anonymized data sets. It is true that the right to
privacy is easily signed away with terms and conditions out of convenience. However, if the
inherent right to privacy we hold in our data was better protected, it would be unacceptable for
companies to force an individual to choose between signing away their data rights or not using
their service, many of which are essential to living in the modern world like email or internet
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browsers. Robust privacy rights would recognize the inherent non-monetary value in data,
whether it was considered private information or private property, and this right as conceived by
Madison would go beyond solely protecting our identities.
With Kerry and Morris’ three points presented, I return to the question of how data
privacy ought to be conceptualized. I argue that Madison’s account of privacy stemming from
property better internalizes the inherent privacy right we hold in our data regardless of its
mutuality, its aggregated value, or its price tag. In decoupling privacy and property, as Warren
and Brandeis do, I believe it becomes more complicated to make the claim that data, even if it
only describes your behavior and omits your name, should not be shared unless you consent to it.
As presented by Kerry and Morris, privacy relates to the protection of one’s identity and property
relates to the commodification of an object, or the right to exclude or share it. It then follows that
data should still be allowed to be shared, if one’s name and personal information are protected.
Warren and Brandeis’ use of the photography examples don’t easily extend to cases where one’s
private information does not involve their image or evoke their name. The property one holds in
the data documenting their actions is left unprotected once anonymized, and this property, or
description of the anonymized individual, is still able to predict and be used to coerce the
population that the anonymous individual resides in. In this way, Madison’s account allows for
much more robust privacy protections. However, tackling this issue within this argument would
impede my account from engaging with all the materials that define property as a commodity
and privacy as a standalone right as Warren and Brandeis do. Thus, I will use Madison’s
property-privacy account to at times contrast the popular understanding, but my argument will
not hinge on rejecting the generally-accepted Warren and Brandeis definitions of privacy and
property.
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Returning once again to data privacy, I will revisit the right to data privacy within the
political sphere, namely as it relates to partisan gerrymandering. While the initial disclosure of
one’s data could be seen as one making information public on Warren and Brandeis’ account, the
compilation of this information presents an obvious departure that aligns with the technological
advances in photography that first inspired Warren and Brandeis’ account. Their account of a
right to privacy argues that the right exists independent of contract law, libel protections or
private property. The question stands: is there evidence that states are using aggregated
information to, beyond solely Census data, to redistrict? Chris Evans holds that campaigns have
“become voracious collectors of personal data” to profile voters and predict voting habits.
However, beyond campaigns, according to an Amicus Brief of Political Science Professors used
by the Supreme Court, mapmakers have access to “expansive data sets that [allow] them to
predict voter behavior accurately” and to new software like “Citigate GIS, Mapitide,... and
ArcGIS” that enable them to create “durably biased maps.”96 While the initial partisan
gerrymandering cases revolved around maps using Census data, the introduction of big data,
described above as aggregated data, presents a unique violation of the right to privacy. I will
argue that this right to privacy, despite being forfeited to third parties and often anonymized, is
still retained by citizens against federal and state governments when a compelling state interest is
absent.
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Chris Evans argues that when data mining is employed the political sphere “‘it begins to
pull back the curtain of one of the most protected locations in America, the voting booth.’”97
Evans' account focuses on political data mining in the context of political campaigns, which are
harder to regulate as many of their actions are justified as political speech under the First
Amendment’s robust protections. The same does not apply to the government, which is meant to
act in the public's interest. Using a citizen’s aggregated, anonymized data to predict their
behaviors and lessen the weight of their votes is a violation of their right to privacy as it uses
private information on them in order to manipulate the democratic process.
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Chapter III: A Constitutional Case for Privacy Rights
I claim that states violate citizens’ right to privacy when they use citizen data to
gerrymander. In this chapter I explore if this claim has any legal backing in the Constitution and
in case law. Before beginning, I discuss states’ laws regarding the data used in mapmaking in
more detail. I then discuss the originalist accounts of Randy Barnett and Lawrence Lessig; while
data is a modern invention, there are originalist methods of interpretation that can inform the
application of the Constitution to modern developments, while ensuring fidelity to its original
meaning and underlying principles. Finally, I present precedent where the right to privacy has
been protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and then present how privacy rights have been
applied to technological advances, namely under Fourth Amendment case law. Ultimately, I find
that there is ample constitutional backing to support a right to privacy that protects us from state
legislatures’ use of voting data and third-party data when they are using this data to serve
partisan interests and not to further compelling state interests; though the Court’s interpretation
of these amendments must be extended to protect citizens from the use of anonymized data if the
original meaning of privacy in the Constitution is to be fully realized today.
Before going into what legally protects our data privacy from partisan gerrymanderers, I
first need to lay out what is known about what information states currently use to draw these
maps. There are no federal laws requiring states to use certain data for redistricting. The
Constitution solely states, in Article 1, Section 2, that congressional apportionment be based on
an “enumeration” of the U.S. population.98 The standard practice over the last few decades has
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been to use federal decennial census data.99 The National Conference of State Legislatures
indicates that currently 22 states require the use of census data for legislative and/or
congressional redistricting; 17 states do not explicitly identify a data source for redistricting; and
five states allow for the possibility of using other data sources, depending on the
circumstances.100 New York and Ohio allow for other data sources if the federal census is
unavailable; Arkansas, Hawaii, Texas, and Indiana require federal census data be used for one
purpose, but do not specify all purposes.101
In a brief filed by political scientists in the Rucho et al v. Common Cause case, the
political scientists argued that gerrymandering today is more accurate and durable due to:
an explosion in granular voter data—now widely available—that allow mapmakers to
predict partisan behavior with a high degree of accuracy, coupled with advancements in
map-drawing software that allow mapmakers to entrench maximal partisan bias.102
In the best-case scenario of data privacy violations, state mapmakers have a wealth of voter data
that allows them to draw maps with a granular breakdown of broader Census data, which I argue
is a violation. However, worst case scenario they are supplementing voting data with additional
information such as “‘data from frequent-buyer cards at supermarkets and pharmacies, huntingand fishing license registries, catalog- and magazine-subscription lists, membership rolls from
unions, professional associations, and advocacy groups.’”103 These datasets are normally
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anonymized, as Census data is, to avoid privacy concerns– though I dispute that this truly avoids
a violation of the right to privacy. ProPublica investigators also revealed that often nongovernmental redistricting groups get involved in the process. These nongovernmental
organizations are funded by “corporations, unions and other special interests” who “provide cash
for voter data, mapping consultants and lobbyists to influence state legislators.”104 Further, these
groups “fund the inevitable lawsuits that contest nearly every state's redistricting plan after it is
unveiled.”105 All this to say, there is evidence that state legislatures, either through groups
proposing maps, or through their own internal mapmaking processes, use data ranging from
voter data to third party data. Either use, I argue, violates a citizen's right to privacy as protected
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further in this chapter I will outline how regulating
the use of these data sources can protect citizens’ privacy and increase transparency in the
redistricting process.
Before moving onto case law that supports the right to data privacy, I want to touch on
the mode of constitutional interpretation that I find useful in understanding how the right to
privacy, which I locate in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, ought to be applied to data.
Originalism helps contextualize the Constitution based on the original meaning of its text and
principles as understood at the time of its framing. That is, by looking at the principles behind
and meanings of the text at the time it was written, one can understand how the text ought to be
applied to modern issues. Randy Barnett and Lawrence Lessig both offer arguments detailing
this interpretative method. Applying Madison’s understanding of property-privacy rights to their
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arguments helps highlight the meaning of the robust privacy rights the Bill of Rights was meant
to protect.
In Restoring the Lost Constitution, Barnett argues that to understand the legitimacy of
any legal system, there must be 1) a procedural conception of legitimacy and 2) a theory of
justice with which the procedures are assessed.106 Barnett holds that the Founders premised our
Constitution on the idea that “natural rights” preceded the formation of the United States
government.107 The Founders view was that “first comes rights, and then comes the
Constitution.”108 According to Barnett, the Constitution is legitimated by its ability to “provide
protection for the preexisting rights retained by the people.”109 As such, any reading of the
Constitution must uphold its legitimating original meaning, and where it is vague it must be
construed in a way that “enhances its legitimacy without contradicting the meaning that does
exist.”110
James Madison’s writings on property indicate the “larger and juster meaning” of
property includes a property in one’s actions and opinions and the resulting right to exclude other
individuals from accessing these sorts of broad property. This right to exclude others from using
personal information was held by citizens, in the eyes of Madison, prior to the Constitution as it
is a natural right we hold due to the property we hold in our persons. The Fourth Amendment
right to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
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and seizure” was meant to protect the property citizens had in their persons and thus a right to
privacy to be “secure” in their actions and opinions, unless warranted by probable cause.111 The
Constitution must be read as protecting this right retained by the people in order to remain
legitimate. Madison argues that because the government is “instituted to protect property of
every sort, “a praise-worthy government cannot solely protect “the possessions of individuals”
but must also “protect them in the enjoyment and communication of their opinion” in which they
have an equally, or potentially more, valuable property.112 Relating this to Barnett, when
questioning how privacy rights ought to be applied to data, Madison’s writings indicate that the
meaning of the right to privacy should extend beyond the legal possession of one’s data, since
people hold a natural right to guard their “enjoyment and communication of their opinions.”113
Construing the Constitution to only protect possessions, and not privacy stemming from one’s
possession of themselves, fails to enhance the legitimacy of the Constitution based on the
meaning of our natural property rights.
Barnett’s argument also presents the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment states that “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” nor “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”114 Barnett argues that in writing the Fourteenth Amendment,
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Senator John A. Bingham “used the words privileges and immunities as a shorthand description
of fundamental or constitutional rights.”115 This wording was linked to Blackstone’s division of
rights and liberties of Englishmen into “privileges” and “immunities,” “that were the residuum of
natural liberties and those “privileges” that society had provided in lieu of natural rights.”116 The
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment chose this wording because its meaning included natural
rights but was also broad enough to include additional rights. Thus, the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the natural property-privacy rights Madison outlines in his
writing. Barnett argues that we must understand the theory of justice underpinning the
Constitution in order to uphold the original meaning of the Constitution and legitimate it. In
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment specifically, this means that the privileges and
immunities, or natural rights, that the Founders meant to protect in signing the Constitution
should inform our modern-day interpretations of the text.
Beyond the general underpinnings of the Constitution touched on by Barnett, Lawrence
Lessig explores how the Constitution ought to be translated while upholding fidelity to its
original meaning. Lessig argues that constancy is the virtue of originalism, however phrases have
different meanings depending on the time in history that they are applied to. Lessig uses a piano
to illustrate his point. If a concert pianist is performing a series of concerts and their piano falls
out of tune, is it more faithful to the original composer of the song to leave it out of tune or to
tune it so that it sounds “the same”? 117 Is this tuning the same infidelity as “changing the tempo
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or cutting some particularly dark passages so the music sounds better?”118 Lessig argues that
there is an important difference between interpretive fidelity and interpretive change. Context
matters, and in applying constitutional principles to a changing world, the same words have very
different meanings if the context of application is not accounted for. Fidelity, Lessig argues,
should be an act of translating as a “translator's task is always to determine how to change one
text into another text, while preserving the original text's meaning.”119
Interpretive fidelity helps to explain how the Fourth Amendment ought to be applied to
personal data. Madison and the Founders instilled a privacy right in the Constitution via the
Fourth Amendment because the British Monarchy had allowed “general warrants,” warrants that
gave government officials free range regardless of their reasoning, to justify searching a British
subject's private quarters.120 This offers meaning to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of one’s
“persons, houses, papers, and effects.”121 The sensitive information contained in these sorts of
physical possessions is now often stored digitally. As data has become a prevalent way to store
this sort of information, interpretive change has occurred that has, as Kerry and Morris argue for,
conceptualized data not as property but merely as a form of information, often owned and stored
by third parties. When anonymized, it is claimed that this information does not violate citizens’
privacy. However, anonymous data still contains the sensitive information on citizens that the
Founders once held in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. Thus, sensitive information
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today is not always the property of the individual that the data describes nor does it always reveal
the individual's identity. But, this does not preclude the data from being used to affect the
anonymous citizen’s life via partisan gerrymandering, as the British Monarch once oppressed
citizens by violating the sensitive information they stored in their houses, papers, and effects.
Regardless of the traditional property rights society has allowed third parties to retain, upholding
interpretive fidelity requires that this modern form of sensitive information be protected from
government invasion unless there is probable cause for doing so. By separating privacy rights
and property rights, as Warren and Brandeis’ account does, interpretations of the amendments
protecting privacy, like the Fourth Amendment, have lost interpretive fidelity because the
sensitive information one once stored in one’s property, their houses, papers, and effects, is now
able to be anonymized and owned by third parties.
In regards to the Fourteenth Amendment, the context of our “privileges and immunities”
and “life, liberty, or property” have changed drastically since the signing of the amendment in
1868. As Barnett indicated, “privileges and immunities,” at the time the amendment was framed,
denoted a broad set of rights, written and natural, that were to be protected when states wrote
laws.122 If the meaning of natural rights included the property-privacy rights detailed by
Madison, then privacy rights should be understood to be part of one’s privileges and immunities.
Translating the original meaning explained in Madison’s writings to a modern context, when
information describing citizens’ is used without their consent, they are being deprived of the
liberty to control who invades the property they hold in their person as well as being deprived of
this property, since their liberty over their property and the property itself are intertwined.

122

Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution : The Presumption of Liberty - Updated
Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 61.

Deckey 49

In explaining some of the Constitution's original meaning, Barnett and Lessig help frame
how the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments should be applied to the case of state legislators
using maps that have been drawn using either data sets containing voting information on citizens
or data sets collected by third parties. The meaning of the privileges and immunities clause
protects citizens from any law that abridges a voter’s right to privacy over data as the
government could have never accessed this sort of information at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framing. Beyond the privileges and immunities clause, one’s right to exclude
others from infringing on their person and to hold a property right in themselves, their actions,
and opinions are both abridged when one’s data privacy is violated in order to draw a map that
distorts the democratic process. Regardless of the traditional property rights one holds over their
data in relation to third parties, Madison’s writings and the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
indicate that the Founders’ believed that one’s personal information should not be infringed upon
by the government without probable cause or Due Process. The information the Founders once
stored in their houses, papers, and effects is now digital. While sensitive information was
invariably stored in physical possessions (papers and effects) and linked to the identity of its
owners, it can now be owned by third parties and describe an individual without revealing their
identity. However, the government’s ability to use this information to manipulate the citizenry
remains the same, and has arguably become more powerful thanks to technological advances.
Ignoring this modern translation of privacy rights threatens to delegitimize our Constitution if the
original meaning of the right to privacy is mistranslated to the digital world.
While these rights are evident by appealing to the Constitution’s original meaning, I
argue that the right to privacy has been recognized by the Supreme Court through Fourteenth
Amendment case law on our zone of privacy; further, this zone of privacy has been construed to
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include personal data under Fourth Amendment case law on the government’s use of technology,
though this zone is still threatened by the use of anonymous data. Notably, the rights violation as
articulated in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment case law would overcome the issues facing
proportional representation gerrymandering claims that I outlined in Chapter I. In the following
paragraphs I will move through the cases that offer precedent for this framework of privacy,
briefly touching on how the Court’s rulings in Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and
Lawrence v. Texas articulated the foundation of citizens’ right to privacy. Then I will present
United States v. Jones and Carpenter v. United States to demonstrate how this right to privacy
has been interpreted to apply to technological advances.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice William Orville Douglas stated that, “the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees to
help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create “zones of privacy” and he cites the
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments as delineating this zone of privacy.123 Citing
this right to privacy, the Court ruled against states that wished to prohibit the use of
contraceptives for married couples.124 Griswold created precedent to protect this “zone of
privacy”, despite the fact that it must be “inferred from several amendments in the Bill of
Rights.”125 Justice William Orville Douglas notes that the case deals “with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights” that is meant to bar the government from employing means that
“sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”126 His writing
touches on Barnett's argument, which indicates that the rights that were meant to be protected by
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the Constitution when it was written predate the Constitution, and the Constitution’s legitimacy
relies on its ability to uphold these rights. Justice Orville Douglas’ insistence that this right is
upheld by multiple provisions of the Constitution reflects James Madison’s conception of
privacy as an essential right stemming from the property right one holds in themselves which
affords them many liberties throughout the Constitution. Griswold enumerated a zone of privacy
that should protect our voting registries, cellular data, and any aspect of our personal lives from
the government’s unnecessarily broad means of redistricting with partisan bias.
This right to privacy was outlined further eight years later in Roe v. Wade. This time,
however, the Majority found that abortion violates one’s privacy due to the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the list of amendments and zone of penumbras cited by
the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart quoted Justice
Harlan in reference to the liberty guarantee of the Due Process Clause:
This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions
and purposeless restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.127
In order to secure our “life, liberty or property,” the Fourteenth Amendment must be read as
ensuring a zone of privacy allowing us to function on a “rational continuum” free from “all
substantial impositions.”128 Again, this reading of a privacy right in the Constitution echoes
Madison’s argument that the right to privacy is so deeply rooted in the property right one holds
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in themselves that, among other liberties stemming from the property right, that the Constitution
cannot be read the protect a series of isolated points– but it must protect the rational continuum
that includes all of these natural rights. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, notes that
while the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the Court has
recognized this zone of privacy in past cases. However, he argues that the right is not unlimited
and the case law upholding privacy rights “acknowledge[s] that some state regulation in areas
protected by that right is appropriate” when the state has an important interest in safeguarding
health, or a “compelling state interest.”129 Roe restates the zone of privacy protected in
Griswold, but helps to clarify that its protections do not only include the bedroom, but
encapsulates the various liberties individuals should hold against all substantial arbitrary
impositions of the government. Further, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe indicates that if states
have compelling state interest to violate an individual's rational continuum of privacy, the
government’s action may be justified.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that the bounds of this rationally continual zone of
privacy extended “beyond spatial bounds.”130 In this case, two men were arrested because they
took part in consensual “deviate sexual intercourse” in the privacy of one of their homes.131 The
Court ruled that the men were “entitled to respect for their private lives” and thus the law
forbidding their consensual, private act violated the Due Process Clause’s protection of liberty.
This ruling colored in the precedent on privacy even further, with the Court enumerating that:
[f]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
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case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.132
This opinion of the court establishes that our right to privacy, as implied throughout the Bill of
Rights, is a zone with borders that are a rational continuum, protected from interferences besides
those that serve compelling state interests, and composed of both concrete property and spatially
transcendent liberties. Lawrence helps to illuminate how this rational continuum of privacy
should extend to data. Data, often revealing our thoughts, beliefs, expressions, or private actions,
should be protected by the Constitution’s privacy provisions as it is an extension of our
autonomy. Further, this spatially transcendent zone of privacy should shield information on us
that is not linked to our identities (or our physical person). Again, this is reminiscent of the
property we hold in ourselves that justifies our liberty to choose what information about
ourselves we want to keep private.
Under Fourth Amendment case law the right to privacy has protected citizens from the
government's use of new technologies to encroach on their zone of privacy. I primarily look at
United States v. Jones, Carpenter v. United States, and the precedent cited in those cases to
demonstrate how the Supreme Court has understood technology in terms of the original meaning
of the right to privacy. However, I note that this right to privacy must be interpreted to include
information that describes our beliefs or behaviors but does not include our identity if the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment is to be realized fully.
In United States v. Jones, Antoine Jones was arrested for drug possession after police had
tracked his vehicle with a GPS tracking device for a month without a warrant.133 The Court
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unanimously found that the installation and subsequent use of the tracking devices was an
unlawful search in violation of Jones’ Fourth Amendment right. While the GPS tracking device
was physically placed on his car, I believe the Court’s reasoning behind the decision, which
revolved around an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy, offers important parallels to
the right to data privacy when it comes to redistricting.
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia said the Fourth Amendment protects a
person’s right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”134 Scalia goes on to argue that the government’s placement of the
tracking device was a physical occupation of Jones’ private property. However, the specifics of
how Jones was violated was disputed by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito who believed the
violation was better conceptualized as a privacy violation than a violation of property, a
disagreement that I will revisit. Justice Scalia goes on to cite the precedent of Katz v. United
States which held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and found that an
eavesdropping device placed in a public telephone booth also violated the Fourth Amendment.135
In Katz, Justice Harlan wrote in concurrence that the government commits a Constitutional
violation when an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy is violated.136 Justice Scalia’s
opinion held that the intrusive device placed on Jones' car violated his personal property and his
reasonable expectation of privacy over that property. Further, Scalia referenced the precedent set
in Kyllo v. United States, that the Court must preserve the degree of privacy against the
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted since it was meant to embody
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a pronounced concern for government trespass upon the areas the amendment enumerates.137 The
protected areas specifically enumerated include one’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects” as
those were the areas where the government could find sensitive information on individuals at the
time of the Fourth Amendment’s framing.138 This point is underscored by Lessig’s idea of
fidelity in translation, since the Court is translating the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment to a modern context. This suspicion initially led them to protect “persons, houses,
papers, and effects”, but the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment aims to protect new
forms of sensitive information and new methods of government invasion. This attempt at
upholding the Constitution’s original meaning is also supported by Barnett’s argument that a
legal system's procedures must be assessed by the theory of justice that underlies them, which in
the Founders’ case was that “first comes rights, and then comes the Constitution.”139 Scalia states
that past rights are preserved when one’s reasonable expectation of privacy is protected, since an
expectation is rooted in concepts of personal property law or to understandings that have been
deemed reasonable by society.
While Scalia’s opinion, and his use of reasonable expectations and Fourth Amendment
originalism, can support a case for data privacy protections against partisan gerrymandering,
Justice Alito’s concurrence offers a distinction that nearly predicts the issue of data privacy.
First, Justice Alito presents multiple reasons why categorizing the tracking device as a search
under the Fourth Amendment is erroneous. He argues that placing the device on the car would
not be originally understood to be a search since the invasion relied on the device
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communicating Jones’ location to the government electronically.140 The device did not affect the
cars functioning in any way and if the device had failed to work it is unclear how its mere
presence on the vehicle, without relaying any information to the government, would be
considered a search. Justice Alito argues that classifying the placement and use of the device as a
search strains the language and case law of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, he notes that it
conflicts with much of the post-Katz precedent which does not require a physical trespass to find
a Fourth Amendment violation and points out that trespass-based precedent has been heavily
criticized.141 Justice Alito still concurred with the Court’s ruling because he agreed that it was an
intrusion on Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Alito underscores that the ruling in
Katz held that Fourth Amendment claims no longer relied solely upon property rights “but upon
whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place.”142
Justice Alito meditates on the future privacy concerns preempted by the Court’s ruling.
He notes that the Court’s reliance on the law of trespass will be troublesome when surveillance
can be carried out electronically without any need for a physical property violation to place a
tracker, as it can be carried out today.143 His criticism for the majority’s physical trespassing
argument is in line with Madison’s argument that people have property in themselves and a right
to privacy stemming from the property rights they hold in themselves. The Majority separated
property rights from privacy rights by classifying the tracking device as a search by physical
trespass instead of articulating that the violation was of Jones property in himself and his
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whereabouts and his right to keep these broadly defined properties private. This sort of
differentiation muddles one’s right to privacy because it erroneously separates intrusion on
physical property from an intrusion on a person's deep-rooted privacy that stems from the
property they hold in themselves. In this way, while the Majority indeed protected Jones’
expectation of privacy, their argument muddles the reasons why Jones could have this
expectation, beyond the right to exclude others from the property he held in his car. Under
Justice Alito’s reasoning, this privacy right fundamentally protects the individual.
Finally, Justice Alito considered how society’s reasonable expectations would evolve as
technology advanced. He wrote:
“Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in
flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and
many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome
the diminution of privacy that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile
themselves to this development as inevitable.”144
Justice Alito’s opinion raises important questions about the standard of reasonable expectations.
His predictions lend themselves to the idea that even if popular attitudes towards privacy change
out of convenience or are shaped by the ubiquity of technology and data collection, the
government should not “confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical
reasonable person.”145 Further, it is important to note that popular expectations are currently in
flux. Kerry and Morris’ argument indicates that data’s characterization as property or as
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information is a recent subject of debate. Further, anonymous data is not generally thought to
violate citizens' privacy, but, as I argue, when anonymous data can still affect the lives of those it
describes, it is still violating its subjects’ privacy. Technology has changed even in recent years
and thus popular expectations have not settled on what is reasonable when it comes to data
privacy. Thus, the Katz test is faced with its own difficulties and the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections as understood by the Framers should guide the application of the
Fourth Amendment to modern contexts.
Setting the debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Alito aside, applying the Jones
precedent to redistricting is helpful in understanding why using citizens’ data to predict how they
will vote is a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections when applied to
technological advances. Detailed information about citizens’ party identification and other thirdparty data are types of information that far exceed the degree of privacy that existed at the time
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
The considerations in Jones were again illuminated in Carpenter v. United States when
the Court decided whether the warrantless seizure of cell phone records also violated the Fourth
Amendment. Up until Carpenter, information shared with a third party (i.e. a bank or a cell
phone carrier) did not violate this zone of privacy because citizens “assumed the risk” of a loss
of privacy by sharing the information with the third party due to the precedent set in Smith v.
Maryland and United States v. Miller. However technological advancements at the time of
Carpenter v. United States led the Court to argue that new forms of “personal location
information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents” (585
U.S. __ (2018). The Court ruled that “warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records” of
four suspects of robbery violated their Fourth Amendment right because cellphone information
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has evolved since Miller and Smith and had become “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled.”146
In deciding the case, the Court held that, following the Katz ruling, the Constitution
protects people and not places. From this, the Court understood the Fourth Amendment to protect
people’s expectations of privacy in order “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials” even in the absence of a property right
violation.147 The Court noted that “personal location information maintained by a third party
does not fit neatly under existing precedent,” but shared similarities with Jones. Since 2018 when
the ruling in Carpenter was handed down, “the fact that the information is held by a third party
does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”148 With these
advancements in precedent, the zone of privacy rationally extends to data that is “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,” regardless if it has been shared with a third party for
other purposes.149 Ultimately, the Court recognized the Madisonian property citizens hold in
their data, even if the citizen does not legally possess the data. Sharing this information with a
third party is irrelevant to the constitutional barriers meant to prevent the government from
invading citizens’ property and the zone of privacy which protects it. Carpenter imports the
original meaning outlined by Madison’s writings by recognizing the privacy rights individuals
should have over their data even if they do not legally own it; in this way, Carpenter
acknowledges citizens’ Madisonian property stored in third party data regardless of it being their
legal property.
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Carpenter offers backing to the argument that one’s data should be protected from state
legislatures looking to use it for partisan purposes. Carpenter created a precedent that supports
citizens’ right to privacy that protects their data from government interference unless the state
has a compelling state interest to use the data. However, the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment must go further if it is to uphold the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In
Carpenter, the four men’s cellular records revealed information that was linked to their
identities. While this is in line with the original meaning of the amendment, the sensitive
information stored in anonymized data still falls in line with the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Sensitive information on an individual can be anonymized, while still allowing the
government to use it to manipulate the democratic process that the individual partakes in.
Carpenter partially advanced this original meaning, but in the case of redistricting the original
meaning of the right to privacy and the Fourth Amendment has yet to be fully translated to
protect citizens’ information that is detached from their names.
The constitutional cases just outlined dealt with issues ranging from reproduction, sexual
relations, tracking devices, and cellular location data. These ranging topics are all linked by the
privacy concerns raised in the cases. The privacy arguments made under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments all tie back to Barnett and Lessig’s originalist interpretive methods. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of the zone of privacy in Griswold, Roe, and Carpenter was
rooted in the Bill of Rights’ guarantee of liberty, a principle the Founders enshrined in the
amendments’ protection of individuals from arbitrary government action. Griswold affirmed that
there is a zone of privacy, created throughout various amendments and penumbras in the Bill of
Rights, that shields the bedroom, or an individual’s marriage, from government interference. In
noting that the case dealt with a “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,” Justice Douglas
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classifies the right to privacy as a natural right that existed prior to the Constitution and that must
be upheld in order to legitimate the founding document. Justice Douglas’ statement echoes the
argument of Barnett.150 Roe clarified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects this right to privacy, since a state regulating abortion violates a woman’s private choice
to terminate her pregnancy; the ruling also reiterated that without a legitimate state interest,
states cannot intrude on individuals’ zone of privacy. Roe upheld the preexisting privacy right
identified in Griswold, but also aimed to demonstrate that if the state had had a legitimate
interest in banning abortion, then it could have outweighed the privacy concern. This aligns with
Barnett since he argues that a legitimate legal system must have a procedural conception of
legitimacy that is then assessed by the preexisting theory of justice endorsed by the Founders. In
Lawrence, the decision mirrored the ruling in Roe; in Griswold and Roe, regulations on pills and
abortions violated this zone of privacy, however, Lawrence showed that intruding on one’s
thoughts, beliefs, and expressions, like one’s sexuality, also violated this zone. In extending this
zone of privacy to “enjoyment and expression of beliefs,” the Court upheld Madison’s
understanding of an individual’s privacy right stemming from the property they hold in their
expressions; additionally, as Barnett argues, this ruling legitimated the Constitution by upholding
the original meaning behind the Fourteenth Amendment which aimed to protect both the natural
and constitutional rights of citizens.
Lessig’s account of interpretive fidelity is also demonstrated by the Fourth Amendment
case law of Jones and Carpenter. Jones demonstrated that the government’s use of new
technologies to track an individual is in violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy and
the privacy protections that were included in the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
150
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When new technologies enable innovative privacy violations, reasonable expectations and the
original meaning of the amendment still protect the zone of privacy. As I discussed earlier in this
chapter, Lessig’s account shows that by translating the Founder’s circumstance, general warrants
used to search houses, papers, and effects, to the government’s warrantless electronic tracking of
Jones’ car, the Supreme Court maintained interpretive fidelity. Finally, Carpenter indicated that
regardless of a third-party’s possession of data on an individual, when the data is extensively
intrusive the government’s acquisition of the information violates the citizen’s reasonable
expectation of privacy and the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This ruling again
translated the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment to a modern context. The ruling also
partially realized Madison’s notion of property-privacy because it recognized the personal nature
of the information and the privacy right inherent to information of this sort, even though the data
was not the individual’s property in the narrow sense. This does not fully unite the broad
property rights and fundamental privacy rights Madison detailed, as I explained anonymized data
should be protected by this original meaning, but it let the privacy right of the individual stand
even though the data was not the individual’s legal property.
Taking this precedent and the originalist backing for these rulings, I want to apply these
interpretations to the voting data and third-party data that states use, which I presented in the
beginning of this chapter. The meaning of the Fourth Amendment was to protect from the sort of
arbitrary searches and seizures the British government conducted. The British government used
general warrants as a “tool of oppression” to target “disfavored religious minorities and political
opponents, such as those who published pamphlets criticizing the government.”151 In these cases,

Brian Frazelle and David Gray, “What the Founders Would Say about Cellphone
Surveillance,” American Civil Liberties Union, June 28, 2019,
151

Deckey 63

targeted individuals were charged with crimes. The Framers may not have imagined that the
right to privacy would eventually be violated in order to create more accurate and effective
partisan gerrymanders. However, the tool of oppression, violating citizens' privacy rights, used
then and now achieves similarly oppressive ends. The ends being to maintain political power and
subvert opposing political forces. Further, the case of redistricting shows that data that is not
linked to citizens identity can still violate the original meaning of right to privacy. When it
comes to criminal charges, the identity of the individual that is described is essential to charging
them with a crime. However, information on the beliefs and behaviors of anonymous individuals
who reside in a state is enough to manipulate their legislative maps and their identity is not
needed. However, the original meaning of the right to privacy was to protect sensitive
information that the government could use against individuals. Anonymous data is still
characterized by this original meaning because it contains sensitive information that can achieve
the same manipulative end even if identities are not revealed. While extending privacy rights as a
protection against partisan gerrymandering would be a new application of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments’ privacy protections, the precedent of the cases outlined in this chapter
indicates that the Court has begun to apply the original meaning of these amendments to modern
privacy violations, and thus it is not implausible that this original meaning could also be applied
to the privacy violations committed by partisan gerrymanderers.
This body of precedent, and the original meaning of these amendments, offers support to
the claim that state legislatures' use of voting and third-party data to gerrymander maps violates
the zone of privacy that existed at the framing of the Fourth Amendment and the zone of privacy

https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/location-tracking/what-founders-would-sayabout-cellphone-surveillance.

Deckey 64

that protects from state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. One’s voting data, and
whatever other third-party data mapmakers may use, contain types of information that goes far
beyond the degree of privacy against the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted, a standard created in Kyllo which Scalia cited in his Jones opinion. If the right to
privacy must be violated to meet the needs of redistricting efforts, it must be for a compelling
state interest, which was the standard used to examine legislators’ motives in Griswold and Roe.
A compelling state interest is a state interest that requires “particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.”152 “The test traditionally applied in the area of
social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational
relation to a valid state objective.”153 In Rucho, the most recent partisan gerrymandering case
heard by the Supreme Court, Representative David Lewis said the state interest in the North
Carolina case was that “electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats. So I drew this
map to help foster what I think is better for the country.”154 In Maryland, the other state involved
in Rucho, Governor Martin O’Malley transparently stated that their objective in gerrymandering
was “to create a map that was more favorable for Democrats over the next ten years.”155
Increased partisan control cannot be a valid state objective because partisanship is a matter of
opinion or preference, and compelling state interests must be strictly scrutinized because they
risk violating fundamental rights and thus there must be proof that the objective is necessary
enough to justify the violation of these fundamental rights.156 This objective could be pursued in
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ways that do not require such an intimate violation of individuals’ data privacy; albeit, without
these additional forms of data on citizens, partisan gerrymandering will effectively be reverted to
its earlier, less effective forms.
However, simply banning openly stated bias may just force gerrymandering efforts to
occur as backroom deals. So, apart from the stated intent of mapmakers, how will the partisan
bias be detected without using the measures of vote dilution that afflicted the gerrymandering
cases outlined in Chapter I? Because the rights violation occurs in the process of mapmaking,
this issue is not so much one of results, but of the bias present into the mapmaking process. The
issue of an undiluted map, as discussed in the gerrymandering cases, is complicated by the
criterion a map should be meeting (compactness, competitiveness, protection communities of
interest, etc.) and how it compromises between these features, and the debate over what criterion
should be prioritized.157 Ultimately, there must be regulations that ensure the mapmaking process
is unbiased before states are given access to data that violates an individual's right to privacy
against the government. Compromises will have to be struck regarding which criteria are fair, but
the process for reaching those compromises can be done in a way where partisan bias is
mitigated, through independent commissions or bipartisan negotiations. As the Voting Rights
Act did with certain states that had a history of voting discrimination, the federal government can
screen state legislatures’ mapmaking processes and ensure there are safeguards against bias,
especially in states that allow the party in power to dominate the mapmaking process.158 I will
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return to the issue of regulation in the final chapter to follow. While further legislation on data
privacy would solidify how these rights ought to be conceptualized, if our privacy is not
protected from being usurped to distort our democratic process a solution may soon be out of
reach. So long as the Court fails to address the latest technology the government is using to
invade citizens’ privacy, aggregated and anonymized data will continue to “‘pull back the curtain
of one of the most protected locations in America, the voting booth.””159
I want to conclude this chapter by restating how the constitutional argument offered in
this chapter overcomes the issues that plagued vote dilution claims. The privacy rights violation
committed by states engaged in partisan gerrymandering is clearly individual in nature as it uses
data on individuals to predict the population's behavior. It also finds its basis in the right to
privacy, a right that has repeatedly been located in the Constitution by the Supreme Court.
Finally, this constitutional right violation justifies the Judiciary’s intervention in states’ control
over election. In the next chapter, the conclusion of my argument, I will address some rebuttals
and challenges my account must face.
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Conclusion: Feasibility and the Future of Data Privacy Rights
In Chapter I, I presented a timeline of partisan gerrymandering cases that have taken
place and outlined why they failed to be justiciable in the Supreme Court’s view. In Chapter II, I
presented multiple accounts of privacy rights, focusing on the tension between James Madison’s
account and that of Warren and Brandeis. I argue that these tensions influence property and
privacy rights today, leaving anonymized data unprotected. In Chapter III, I outlined two
originalist arguments regarding the original meaning of privacy in the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to support my argument that the original meaning of these amendments should
protect data on citizens from government invasion. I then moved through Supreme Court case
law that 1) established that we hold a right to privacy against state governments through the
Fourteenth amendment, and 2) that under Fourth amendment jurisprudence, the government’s
use of technology has been found to violate citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy and to
violate the amendment’s original meaning. However, there are still many rebuttals and obstacles
facing this account. One challenge is that currently redistricting groups can legally get access to
data by citing a state interest in accessing it and these datasets are not thought to raise privacy
concerns because the data is anonymized. Further, many will ask, even if this argument is
accepted, how will partisan bias be identified and regulations on partisan bias be enforced? In
concluding this argument, I address both these concerns before offering a final word on the
existential crisis this privacy rights violation poses to our democracy, and to our society on the
whole.
In a conversation I had with a consultant who works in redistricting, he explained that 1)
all the data sets used in redistricting are anonymous and thus don’t violate individuals’ privacy
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and 2) whatever information that redistricting efforts claim to need in the mapmaking process
becomes legally public to serve the state interest in mapmaking. Further, he explained that in the
case of states that solely use party registry and voting data, this information is often already
public and so the government is not availing itself to private information. This conversation
demonstrated how the tensions between Madison’s account and Kerry and Morris’ argument
play out in the day to day process of redistricting.
When redistricting groups identify a need for some sort of data, voting data for example,
the consultant explained to me that they cite a reason for needing the data, and are invariably
given access because they are serving the state interest of redistricting. Then, the information
often has to be made publicly available to citizens for transparency, depending on state
redistricting laws. Further, he explained accessing this data does not pose privacy concerns
because the data is anonymized. As I detailed throughout this account, the Madisonian propertyprivacy account is in clear tension with the idea that anonymized data, while still describing the
party identification of individuals in a certain district, does not violate their right to privacy.
On Madison’s account any violation of property, or information on oneself, violates their
right to exclude others, or their right to privacy; privacy is not linked to identity but is linked to
one’s liberty to exist and exercise their free choice over their property. While voting data may be
in the possession of other entities, like political parties or data brokers, the data’s ability to
describe citizens so intimately, and its resulting ability to be used to manipulate the citizen,
should allow them to have a privacy right in the information even if they do not legally own that
information. As the ruling in Carpenter decided, cellular location data owned by a third party
could still be protected by the right to privacy– though this data was not anonymous. Theorizing
that this information is property in the broad, philosophical sense, as Madison did, demonstrates
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the harm in the modern-day norm of separating privacy rights and property rights, linking
privacy to identity and property to the right to exclude. Regardless of the anonymity of the
citizen, information on that person's real-life behaviors are being used by state governments to
predict their behavior and to create maps that are manipulated based on that information.
Anonymity does not protect them from the effects of a distorted democratic process. Madison’s
account captures why anonymity does not prevent the privacy violation that occurs when state
legislatures use data on citizens to partisan gerrymander. The state government is still usurping
the Madisonian property that the data contains in its description of the individual’s behaviors.
Once this is established and recognized by Courts, the states’ interest in this information will
have to be justified to be a compelling state interest. As explained above, increased partisan
control cannot be a valid state objective because partisanship is a matter of opinion or preference,
and compelling state interests must be strictly scrutinized as necessary to justify the violation of
these fundamental rights.
Even beyond Madison’s tension with the idea that the government can use anonymous
data to redistrict, this violates the precedent in Jones, where Scalia ruled that the Court must
preserve the degree of privacy against the government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted since it was understood to embody a pronounced concern for government
trespass.160 It is not clear why using anonymized information about citizens’ party identification
is in line with the degree of privacy that existed at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
At the time the Fourth Amendment was written, information was stored in physical property and
the government could not use anonymous writings against individuals because they needed the
individuals’ identity to charge them with a crime. Today, software allows anonymous
160
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information to be extremely useful in manipulating maps, while relying on the same sort of
sensitive information that was once held in physical property. Anything beyond census data
should not be used by mapmakers unless there is a clear demonstration that the process is serving
a compelling state interest and is not serving the interests of a single party.
If anonymous data on voting registries, voting history, or other third-party data should
not be used by the states if they are being used to create biased maps and to harm individual
voters, how will this bias be identified and is this standard even enforceable? As touched on at
the end Chapter III, the issue posed by vote dilution claims was that there was no way to answer
“how much gerrymandering is too much?” when looking at gerrymandered maps, because all the
arguments made relied on statistical standards to prove constitutional rights violations that the
Court did not recognize. By identifying that citizens’ right to privacy as the right violated, my
account responds to the question of “how much gerrymandering is too much?” with “any of it.”
This right to privacy can only be violated if there is a compelling state interest. While it is very
difficult to evaluate how much partisan bias in a map violates a constitutional right, identifying
that the right to privacy is violated will force state legislatures to prove that they are not serving
partisan interests before the mapmaking process can have access to the data that makes
gerrymandering so effective today.
No map is perfect and looking for evidence of bias in the maps will run into the same
issues vote dilution claims do. Gerrymandering is difficult to measure. As demonstrated in
redistricting debates around the country and illustrated in case law, mapmakers sometimes have
to sacrifice making the most competitive district in order to respect a community of interest,
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which is a “a group of people with a common interest” that legislation might benefit.”161 There
are many competing criteria that can be prioritized or ignored in the mapmaking process. These
endlessly debatable considerations are what make partisan gerrymandering such a fraught issue.
My argument is that in order to justify violating a citizen’s right to privacy, a compelling state
interest must be offered and upheld. By ensuring a single party is not left to their own devices to
violate citizens’ privacy while partisan gerrymandering shamelessly, a state can demonstrate that
they are serving a compelling state interest and not the partisan interests of the ruling party. This
can be achieved by setting up independent commissions, which are used by nine states; political
commissions, which seven states use (each a bit differently) to balance political interests by
evenly appointing elected officials from each party; or by ensuring the state legislature’s
redistricting process cannot be primarily controlled by a single party’s majority.162 Similar to the
requirement that three-fourths of state legislatures must ratify an amendment before altering the
Constitution, the foundational text of our democracy, there must be stronger measures to ensure
that elections, the foundational mechanism of democracy, cannot be subverted to a single party’s
interests.
Beyond safeguards in the mapmaking process, some may argue that regulating this and
ensuring that bias still does not find its way into the process is impossible. However, the
government been able to achieve effective regulation of insider trading, a form of bias, or an
information asymmetry, in investing that could be similarly difficult to regulate. Insider trading
occurs through unethical behavior in a process (choosing an investment) that could be “explained
away” when pointing solely to results. The difficulty of proving what information is shared in an
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office and then is used to make personal investments is similar to proving what intentions are
shared in a redistricting meeting and then used to draw a map. Both unethical investments and
biased maps could be denied through using plausible deniability of what the intent or knowledge
behind the investment or map was. However, the SEC has effectively persecuted insider traders
since 1961. Jennifer Moore, who wrote What is Really Unethical about Insider Trading?,
explains that “preventing insider trading requires continuous and extensive monitoring of
transactions and the ability to compel disclosure, and privately imposed penalties do not seem
sufficient to discourage insider trading.”163 State legislatures will not regulate their own partisan
bias. The SEC is able to regulate insider trading because it allotted resources to monitoring
transactions and has created serious penalties to punish violators. The case of insider trading
shows that if the law eventually recognizes this rights violation as wrong, with the impetus of
judicial action, the monitoring and regulatory scheme necessary to enforce the need for unbiased
use of citizens’ data is possible. Moore notes that the SEC’s penalties did not effectively
discourage insider trading until the Insider Trading Sanctions Act was passed in 1984, though its
efficiency continues to be criticized to this day. While the regulation may never be perfect, as the
SEC shows, it is still possible to deter violators by allocating resources to monitoring the issue
and demonstrating that violators will face serious consequences for their actions.
Ultimately, the details of enforcement are a problem that would come much farther down
the road. First, the Court must recognize the tensions in our current privacy jurisprudence and the
fundamental right to privacy that are allowing the government to invade our privacy in order to
partisan gerrymander and distort our democratic voices. This use of citizen data goes against the
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original meaning of privacy as articulated by James Madison and the original meaning of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Anonymizing sensitive information does not overcome the
original meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments which were meant to protect
citizens’ sensitive information from government invasion and arbitrary use of such information.
Data privacy is an issue that our society will have to grapple with as AI, machine learning, and
other technological advances upend the construction of rights we know today, as it did with
privacy and property rights as they were conceived by Madison.
Before concluding, I want to return to Justice Kagan’s quote:
What was possible with paper and pen—or even with Windows 95—doesn’t hold a
candle (or an LED bulb?) to what will become possible with developments like machine
learning. And someplace along this road, “we the people” become sovereign no longer.164
Ultimately, as society explores and answers questions related to data and privacy in the private
sphere, we must note the paramount importance of addressing this issue first in our democracy.
Without functioning elections, our democracy, the only tool we have to make our voices heard in
these discussions, will slip from our collective grasp. Predicting our behaviors, as data allows
gerrymanderers to do with terrifying accuracy, will only weaken our ability to correct these
rights violations as the democratic process will be manipulated to serve the interests of those in
power. The Founders understood privacy was a fundamental right. While our conception of
privacy has become muddled by new types of property and a narrowing of the right to privacy in
the digital world, we must realign this right with its original meaning– a right meant to protect us
from the arbitrary invasion of the government. If the original meaning of this fundamental right
to privacy is lost to modernity, our sovereignty may well go with it.
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